Abstract: With the advent of EMU monetary policy can no longer be used to prevent housing market bubbles in regional economies such as Ireland or Spain. However, fiscal policy can and should be used to achieve the same effect. This paper shows that the advent of EMU relaxed existing financial constraints in Ireland and Spain, allowing a more rapid expansion of the housing stock in those countries to meet their specific demographic circumstances. However, the failure to prevent these booms turning into bubbles did lasting damage to the two economies, damage that could have been avoided by more appropriate fiscal policy action.
Managing Housing Bubbles in Regional Economies under
EMU: Ireland and Spain
Introduction 1
Over the last thirty years the housing market has been a source of significant economic instability on at least one occasion in each of a wide range of OECD economies. When housing bubbles have burst they have caused substantial damage to the affected economy. As a result, they ought to be a cause for concern for economic policy makers. On some occasions when housing bubbles have burst they have also been associated with significant disruption to the domestic financial system (e.g. in the mid-west of the US in the mid 1980s, in Scandinavia in 1989/1990 and today in the US, Spain and Ireland). Any such financial sector disruption greatly magnifies the macro-economic disruption which is caused by a housing sector collapse (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003) .
The analysis carried out in Girouard et al. (2006) , indicates that when housing bubbles have occurred in the past they were essentially idiosyncratic in nature -they generally did not occur simultaneously across major regions of the OECD. The analysis in Himmelberg et al. (2005) also indicates that prior to the recent crisis there has not been a "US housing bubble" but rather a series of local bubbles in individual cities or regions in the US at different times over the last quarter of a century.
Until the current crisis there was little evidence that housing bubbles had become any more frequent over time and it is also interesting that, even with monetary union in the US, there had not, until now, been any obvious tendency for a "convergence" of bubbles within the US, much less in the EU. However, Girouard et al. (2006) suggest that global factors were important in continuing the housing boom across quite a number of markets in the period up to 2006 and this may explain why today there are housing market crises in an unusually large number of EU members as well as in the US.
This idiosyncratic pattern reflects the fact that the drivers of housing prices are varied in nature and they include significant local or regional variables. Himmelberg et al. (2005) refer to the role of "superstar cities" where local circumstances can result in a prolonged period of higher than average growth in house prices.
The evidence suggests that until recently housing markets in the Euro area mirrored the pattern in the US, with some national markets showing very rapid inflation in asset values and others showing no inflation at all. While there is today some synchronisation across certain EMU members in their housing cycles, there is still very considerable diversity across the EMU. For example, in Ireland and Spain there is currently a major down turn in the housing market while in Germany and
Finland there is no evidence of any major reduction in housing prices or output.
While housing market crashes in individual economies have generally not had global implications they have had very severe repercussions domestically. This is the case today in Ireland and Spain. It is important to understand what drives these housing markets so that future bubbles might be avoided. Because of the serious damage that housing crashes can cause to individual economies it will be important in the future to develop policy instruments to manage housing markets and to prevent dangerous bubbles occurring. While monetary policy is not a suitable instrument within EMU for this purpose because of the idiosyncratic nature of housing markets, this paper argues that fiscal policy instruments can achieve the desired impact if used in an innovative fashion.
In Section 2 of this paper the demographic factors that underpin long-term demand for housing are considered with particular reference to Ireland and Spain. This paper goes on in Section 3 to set out a simple model of the housing markets in Ireland and
Spain. In the context of these models Section 4 considers how the advent of EMU has changed the cost of capital facing households and how this has affected the experience of Ireland and Spain in the current decade. Section 5 discusses the significance of the building sector in these two economies, an important factor in determining the macroeconomic impact of a housing price crash. Section 6 discusses the implications of this experience for how housing markets should be managed in the future in EMU.
Monetary policy, as implemented by the ECB, cannot be targeted at preventing dangerous situations arising in any individual regional housing market. The problem that this poses for members of EMU is discussed, together with the appropriate fiscal strategy for managing potential regional bubbles. Section 7 presents conclusions.
The Drivers of the Housing Market -Demographics
The desired stock of housing in the long run in any economy is a function of permanent income, the user cost of housing, the cost of building, the availability of credit, local factors, and, crucially, the demographic structure. Because houses typically have very long lives and because demographic circumstances in individual economies change slowly the new build each year is typically a small proportion of the actual stock of dwellings. While the legacy effects of the destruction caused by the Second World War required major investment in the 1950s and 1960s, in many
European countries this reconstruction work is long since completed. However, there may be issues for the new EU 12 member states related to the legacy effects of a half a century under communist rule. Today there are still significant differences in demography across the EU-15 which imply there will be regional differences in the demand for housing in the long-term. Girouard et al. (2006) and ECB (2006) analyse the role of "fundamentals" in determining house prices. This research, and the research on individual EU economies (e.g. Duffy, 2002; Murphy, 2006 on Ireland, and Murphy, 2008 However, there is evidence that in spite of the very serious decline in the economy in 2008 the number of households showed a record increase in that year suggesting a rapid response of headship rates to a very big reduction in rents (Bergin et al., 2009 ).
5 With a very small share of the population aged over 75 the numbers dying each year leaving dwellings vacant for the younger generation is low. In countries such as Germany the population is closer to demographic balance. to the EU average mean that priority is given to other forms of investment today, in the future rising incomes could see a major growth in demand for new housing. As in Spain and Ireland, managing these pressures in the future to ensure that the rest of the economy is not crowded out will be important.
A Model of House Prices
In this section we specify and estimate new house price equations for both Ireland and 
The standard model does not include any variables capturing the effects of financial liberalisation on house prices. Roche (2003) and McQuinn (2004) use alternative versions of the standard model by including an average mortgage loan variable as a proxy for financial liberalisation. However Murphy (2006) has criticised the inclusion of the average mortgage variable as an explanatory variable on a number of grounds including the argument that the mortgage loan variable is not independent of house prices. In the absence of a reliable measure of financial liberalisation, we follow the approach of Murphy (2006) and include a dummy for 2003 which is designed to pick up "the combined effects of financial liberalisation, policy interventions since 1998 and speculative frenzy effects".
In Equation (2) 8 The dummy variable is set equal to zero up to and including 2003 and is set equal to one thereafter. 
The full 
The estimated 
The Cost of Capital
Prior to EMU there were substantial differences in the cost of capital facing householders across the EU. These differences in the cost of capital may have slowed investment in housing in some countries where they were relatively high. However, the advent of EMU substantially changed the expected cost of capital facing agents in many member states of the Euro area. It meant that there was substantial convergence in the nominal interest rate facing similar agents across the EMU. However, because of continuing differences in the rate of inflation across the EMU real interest rates still differ for households.
EMU "liberalised" credit markets
The financial sector has undergone major changes over the last thirty years. This has involved both liberalisation and the changes consequent on the move to Economic and Monetary Union. These two developments have combined to provide a dramatically different environment today for households wanting to finance investment in housing compared to thirty years ago. In the 1970s many households in Ireland and Spain were credit constrained and were not able to finance their optimal level of investment in housing. However, it was not just the availability of finance that has changed but its cost has also been reduced by the move to monetary union and also by financial liberalisation in the 1990s and the early years of this decade. Worldwide lax monetary policy over the last decade reduced the cost of capital, not just in Ireland and Spain, but also for households in most developed economies. However, the advent of EMU as well as financial liberalisation potentially reduced the cost of finance by making available a much wider pool of savings without incurring exchange rate risk.
In the Irish case, up to the end of the 1970s all mortgage finance was provided by "building societies". These financial institutions raised all their finance from deposits, generally by households. They were all mutual companies facing rather different incentives than private limited companies (that can be assumed to be profit maximisers). As a result, interest rates were not used as an instrument to clear the mortgage market and there was widespread credit rationing. In some cases the building societies operated queuing based on the length of time that a borrower had previously been a depositor.
Over the course of the 1980s the standard banking system moved into the mortgage market and building societies began to raise some of their funds from the interbank market rather than from small depositors. Also the building societies themselves moved away from the mutual model so that they had an incentive to use price (the interest rate) to clear the market.
There are a number of implications of these institutional changes. In the 1970s credit rationing was the norm in finance for housing. The interest rate was dependent on the availability of domestic savings and would have been little affected by exchange rate risks. The extent of rationing would have depended on the competition for personal deposits and the demand for mortgages. However, over the course of the 1980s as the market liberalised and as financial institutions had access to the interbank market, the constraint on finance was relaxed. Instead the cost of finance was increasingly related to the cost of funds on the local interbank market. One of the key long-term reasons why membership of EMU was considered desirable for Ireland and many other potential members was the expected impact on interest rates and the cost of capital (Baker, Fitz Gerald and Honohan, 1996, Calmfors, 1997) .
For countries such as Spain, Ireland, and the UK, historically there had been a significant risk premium attaching to borrowing in their own currency relative to borrowing in DMs. Table 2 shows a measure of the risk premium, the excess returns for governments from borrowing in DMs and lending in the local currency, for two time periods, 1980-1999 and 1985-1999 . This is calculated using medium-term government bonds -it is the risk premium that faced the government sector. The advent of EMU saw such differentials between yields on government bonds almost disappear. However, over the past year the differentials have again reappeared in a dramatic form as a consequence of the current financial crisis and the differing exposure of different countries to its consequences.
Thus for most of the member governments, as expected, the advent of EMU substantially reduced the cost of capital. This had a very striking positive impact on the public finances for countries that were heavily indebted, especially where the debt was financed on a short to medium term basis -Italy. The notable exception to this was Germany which had experienced a lower real cost of capital for some considerable time. 10 For the UK it is 1979-1998. Multinational firms trading on the world market always had the opportunity to borrow in DMs, availing of the lower cost of finance. With diversified trade such firms could also hedge their currency risk within the firm itself, availing of the lowest available cost of finance internationally. In recent years, with financial liberalisation, many commercial firms in the EU also had access to financial instruments which allowed them to hedge some of their foreign currency risk at a price. This meant that for multinational firms the cost of capital was probably lower than for firms trading purely on the domestic market. This would suggest that the benefits of a reduction in nominal interest rates as a result of EMU, while significant for the company sector, were probably greatest for smaller firms.
For much of the private sector borrowing in the local currency in Ireland, Spain and elsewhere a significant exchange risk premium was payable prior to EMU as a cost of having an independent currency. This meant that the cost of capital for housing in such countries had been substantially greater than that for households in Germany and other countries where interest rates were broadly related to the DM. As this difference in the cost of capital had persisted over a long period it meant that prior to EMU, even with similar income levels and demographics, the optimal long-run stock of dwellings would have been lower than in Germany or the Netherlands. The advent of EMU, reducing the cost of capital permanently for households, will have raised the optimal long run stock of dwellings.
In addition to the interest rate premium payable by the household sector in Ireland and Spain prior to EMU, there was a further factor that is difficult to quantify, but which affected the availability of capital to fund housing investment. In the case of both Spain and Ireland we have seen in recent years that the surge in investment in housing has had its counterpart in a major increase in the balance of payments deficit.
In turn, this deficit has been partially financed by the financial system borrowing abroad to onlend to the domestic household sector to fund their housing investment. The effect of EMU membership has thus been to reduce the financing costs for households engaging in a huge investment programme in domestic housing in Spain and Ireland. Prior to EMU such a boom would probably have fizzled out at a much earlier stage as banks faced an ever rising cost of funds, costs which they would have had to pass on to customers. However, while EMU played a very important role in relaxing the constraints on the banking systems in Ireland and Spain the importance of the wider integration of financial markets should not be underestimated. The low cost of finance world-wide not only affected the Euro area but also the other members of the EU. As shown in Figure 3 , Poland, while not a member of EMU saw a rather similar process, though on a more limited scale, where domestic banks borrowed abroad to fund domestic investment. However, unlike in Ireland, much of this funding may have been sourced within individual banks from their parents in Austria, Italy or Scandinavia.
Nonetheless whatever the immediate source of the funds it did allow housing investment to expand in Poland.
A substantial part of this lending in Poland and Hungary took place in foreign currencies, especially Euros and Swiss Francs (Pawlowski, 2006) . While this provided funding for housing to the household sector at a low nominal interest rate it also transferred the related exchange risk to those households. The fact that this source of funding was available at a low nominal interest rate in Poland (and other EU members not part of the Euro area) suggests that even without the advent of EMU, financial liberalisation could have still allowed significant housing booms in Ireland and Spain over the last decade.
The Real Cost of Capital
For firms selling their goods on the world market, whose output price is set on that market, the appropriate price deflator to use in calculating the real rate of interest is their output price. As a consequence differences in domestic inflation rates do not necessarily affect their cost of capital. Thus where a firm manufacturing cars in Spain, sells those cars at a price determined on the EU market in Germany, the Spanish rate of inflation in consumer prices does not directly affect its real cost of capital. Within EMU, with similar nominal interest rates across all EU members for similar firms the cost of capital for such firms is, as a result, independent of their location within the EMU and of the local rate of inflation in consumer prices.
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However, for the household sector the appropriate price deflator is that for personal consumers' expenditure. As shown in Figure 4 , in both Ireland and Spain real interest rates for households were very high in the early 1990s. However, with the approach of EMU real rates began to fall rapidly. While EMU was the major factor in the fall in interest rates, developments in global financial markets also played some role.
11 Obviously higher rates of inflation in consumer prices may translate into growing labour cost differentials which would differentially affect firms in different countries in the EMU.
Figure 4: Real Interest Rates in Ireland and Spain
While EMU brought about a substantial reduction in the real cost of capital for households in many member countries, this reduction was particularly marked in the case of Spain and Ireland. With much higher rates of inflation in consumer prices in Ireland and Spain over the course of the first decade of EMU the real interest rate faced by the household sector in those countries was much lower than in Germany or France. In turn, this encouraged further investment in housing, adding to the pressure on the labour market and, ultimately, domestic consumer prices.
In addition to the reduction in the real interest rate for households, EMU made it much easier for the domestic financial system to fund a major investment surge by households. The fact that this change occurred as a result of a regime change (EMU) meant that it was perceived as a permanent reduction in the cost of capital raising the optimal long run stock of housing. When combined with the lower endowment of dwellings in Spain and Ireland it is not surprising that there was a strong impact on the housing sector.
The Role of Building in the Economy
The building and construction sector, and housing in particular, accounts for very different shares of the economy across EU member states. For those economies such as France and Germany, where the housing stock appears to be close to its long-term equilibrium, investment in housing accounts for around 5 to 6 per cent of GDP (Table   3 ). The average for the US is under 5 per cent. Over the last thirty five years, while there have been fluctuations in the share of housing investment in GDP, the difference in share between peak and trough has been between 3 and 4 percentage points of GDP. This actually exaggerates the extent of the cyclical fluctuations for these countries as the peak occurred in the 1970s and the trough in the last decade. For the UK, housing investment accounts for an even smaller share of GDP. In the case of
France and Germany, their recent investment in building and construction, expressed as a share of GDP, has been below the average for the last 35 years (Table 3) . For the UK it has been slightly above the average, though well below the highest levels achieved in the past. The fact that housing accounts for a limited share of GDP does not prevent bubbles in house prices from occurring or from affecting aggregate economic activity through wealth effects but it does limit the direct effects of the housing cycle on aggregate demand. In the UK, in spite of the small share of economic activity accounted for by housing investment, it has suffered two cases of house price bubbles bursting in the last 20 years -one around 1990 and the second that is currently taking place. percentage points of GDP and a massive 10 per cent in the case of Ireland. In the case of both of these countries housing investment in 2006 accounted for a record share of GDP ( Figure 5 ). This peak in activity is not just a cyclical event -the share of GDP accounted for by housing investment has been well above the previous levels over the past decade in both these countries reflecting both the demographic factors discussed above and also the changed circumstances of EMU. These two economies could not continue allocating such a high share of economic resources to this form of investment indefinitely.
The housing price and output booms in Spain and Ireland had a major impact on both these economies. To allocate such a high share of national resources to investment in housing, a major redeployment of resources was needed into the building and construction sector. High prices for housing and the enhanced profitability of the building sector resulted in a major expansion in activity, requiring a dramatic increase in the labour force employed in that sector. This bid up wage rates in the sector relative to the levels they would otherwise have maintained. In turn this attracted labour from other sector of the economy.
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While a significant part of the additional labour force in building and construction in both Ireland and Spain came from returning emigrants (in the case of Ireland), or from immigration in the case of both countries, there was, nonetheless, a major impact on the domestic labour market. At the peak approximately 20 per cent of employees in building and construction in Ireland were immigrants whereas the share in the late 1990s would have been close to zero. While this influx of labour moderated the impact on wage rates, it was not sufficient to offset the huge stimulus to the domestic labour markets in the two economies. The result has been that wage rates throughout the two economies rose much more rapidly than in the rest of EMU so that both economies lost competitiveness .
The result of this demand shock has been that the tradable sector, in both Ireland and Spain, has been "crowded out" by the building and construction sector. Both countries have seen a rapid decline in market share for their exports and the result has been a rapidly rising balance of payments deficit. This process is very similar to that where a major expansion in the public sector crowds out the (tradable) private sector.
This process is described in Blanchard, 2007 where he illustrates the potential problems caused by this crowding out and concludes that government action may be required to moderate this process even in a perfect market (Blanchard, 2007) .
This development would not necessarily have been very serious if the reallocation of resources to the building and construction sector were permanent. However, as argued above, the reallocation was essentially temporary due to a "catching up" in the stock of dwellings. If the catch up had been better managed by the respective governments so that it took place over a longer time scale then the reallocation of resources would have been more limited and the period for which the resources would have been utilised in the building and construction sector would have been much longer. As it is, the collapse in housing output in Ireland and Spain is releasing major resources, especially labour, resulting in a very rapid rise in the unemployment rate.
However, while many firms in the tradable sector were forced to shut down due to their loss of competitiveness over the last five years, it will be quite a number of years before the labour market adjusts to restore competitiveness. Even then it will be some time before domestic output of tradables adjusts to fill the gap 14 .
As the adjustment continues, the balance of payments deficits in both countries can be expected to fall. However, in the case of Spain it is to be expected that in the long run there will be a continuing significant balance of payments deficit. Because so much of the demand for housing in Spain is for holiday homes and because many of these are bought by foreigners, the resulting capital inflow could sustain a substantial deficit over a prolonged period. While sales of holiday homes to foreigners are treated as a sale of an asset they are very close to being a tradable commodity. It is possible, if the market so desires, to build holiday homes very densely in large numbers for the foreseeable future -there is not a fixed supply of assets. This makes this market sustainable. The case is rather different for Estonia where much of medieval Tallinn has been sold to foreigners. As it takes a millennium to build a medieval dwelling Cameron, et al (2006) reached a rather different conclusion for the UK suggesting that a significant risk of a bubble existing in that economy. Rae and van den Noord (2006) , looking at the Irish economy suggested that house prices were significantly above their equilibrium level. In EUROFRAME-EFN, 2006, the exposure of the Irish and Spanish economies to shocks was considered. It was suggested in that report that in the case of both economies there was a risk of a housing bubble.
Throughout 2006 house prices continued to rise in Ireland, Spain and the UK and the building construction sector continued to increase its share of economic activity in the former two countries putting pressure on the tradable sector. As we know now the bubble has burst in all three economies (as well as in the US). The question is now what the impact of this will be on those economies and how long it will be before they return to "normal". In all three economies the turning point came when potential buyers lost confidence in the prospect of future capital gains and stopped buying. The result was a fall in price and with the prospect of further falls in prices the user cost of owner occupation rose very rapidly. In turn, the building industry itself reacts with a significant lag so that output continued high in 2007. It is really only in 2008 in
Ireland that the output of the sector began to show major adjustment.
What is interesting about the Spanish and Irish cases (and it is also true of the US)
is that the bursting of the bubble was not caused by uncertainty in the financial markets but had a domestic trigger which changed agents expectations about future capital gains. Of course in the US it was the downturn in the housing market which caused (rather than was caused by) the financial dislocation that is so troubling the world economy. In the case of Ireland and Spain there is also very significant fall-out for the financial system from the burst property market bubble. In the case of the Irish financial system there was no exposure to toxic US assets. Instead the overexposure to risky domestic lending for property development has precipitated a major domestic financial crisis. Table 4 shows the maximum falls in price that have occurred in the past in a sample of OECD economies when local housing bubbles burst. The largest falls experienced in the past were in Finland and the Netherlands where prices fell by 50 per cent. In quite a number of cases, including Ireland and the UK, the previous largest falls were of the order of 30 per cent. Past experience cannot tell us what will happen this time around in Ireland, Spain and the UK but it is a guide to the fact that the falls may be very significant (Kelly, 2007) .
In the case of Ireland Van den Noord (2006) that. They will continue to fall until buyers are convinced that they can go no further down. As buyers return to the market they may then raise prices, which, by holding out the prospect of potential capital gains, in turn, reduces the user cost of housing thereby stimulating the market. Thus it is very difficult to forecast the trajectory of prices towards a new equilibrium as a bubble bursts.
The potential effects on Ireland of the housing bubble bursting were considered in detail in Fitz Gerald, et al., 2005 . Since that analysis was carried out the housing sector continued to expand for one further year, buoyed up by inappropriately stimulatory government policy. Thus the potential fall in output could be larger than that work envisaged. However, it does give a reasonable quantification of the potential impact of the bursting of the housing bubble on the economy.
However, for both Spain and Ireland the bursting of the property market bubble has coincided with the world recession and this has greatly aggravated the effects on the two economies. In the case of Ireland the cumulative fall in GDP over the period 2008-10 is expected to be around 12 per cent (Barrett et al., 2009) while the fall in Spain could be of the order of 3 per cent (Holland et al., 2009) . Rising unemployment will result in a major slowdown in the rate of increase in labour costs, especially in Ireland. (Current forecasts using a model of the labour market suggest that nominal wage rates could fall by 7 per cent between 2009 and 2011, Bergin et al. , 2009 .) If such an adjustment in labour costs does take place it will eventually result in an expansion in the tradable sector of the economy as exports rise consistent with a more competitive environment. However, there is likely to be a major permanent reduction in Irish output as a result of the combined impact of the bursting of the property market bubble and the world recession.
In terms of the macro-economic dislocation consequent on the bursting of the housing bubble, a very important factor will be how long the adjustment to a new equilibrium takes. Typically, in the OECD area it takes between one and two years for sellers to accept a fall in real house prices of 10 percentage points (Kelly, 2007) . This would suggest that if nominal house prices were to fall by a third relative to their peak in Ireland it could take between three and four years.
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The longer drawn out the adjustment process the greater the economic cost. While sellers refuse to contemplate a major fall in price and potential buyers hold out of the market there is no incentive for anyone to build more dwellings. In addition, all the businesses which are closely allied to the housing market (mortgage lenders, lawyers, estate agents, suppliers of furniture etc.) experience a dramatic downturn in activity. If sellers could be persuaded to adjust their expectations much more rapidly, so that prices find their long-term equilibrium level, the housing sector would see an earlier return to "normal". In the case of the UK today the adjustment of expectations seems unusually rapid, which may hasten the end of the crisis. In Ireland house prices seem to be falling at the rate of around 10 per cent a year.
Another measure of the extent of the adjustment needed is the excess stock of unoccupied dwellings. It is difficult to estimate such a number but it is clear that there is a build up in stocks of finished dwellings in both Ireland and Spain. Until these dwellings are filled through renting or sale to new households there will continue to be downward pressure on the market. In both countries the demographics mean that there will be a continuing rise in household numbers in spite of the slowdown. Thus, even with inertia, the excess stock will be gradually eaten away. However, it is likely that the dynamics of the market will produce a somewhat faster resolution.
Pressures from the banking system to see an immediate return on the assets has resulted in a significant part of the excess stock being put on the rental market. There is strong evidence that this is happening with a consequential major reduction in rents.
As outlined earlier, the rental market is very thin in Ireland and Spain and such an outcome would have a major initial downward impact on rents. Already renting is more attractive than purchase at current house prices. With rents falling and no prospect in the next year of a rise in house prices there is every incentive for households to rent rather than buy. However, the fall in the cost of housing will result in a rise in demand. In particular, the much lower headship rates in Ireland and Spain than might be expected means that there is considerable scope for headship rates to rise. Bergin et al., 2009 , suggests that this is already happening in Ireland in spite of the rising unemployment rate. Once the non-housing economy shows signs of recovering there could be a rapid take-up of "surplus" rented dwellings and a move by
Irish and Spanish households to a more "European" rate of household formation.
Managing the housing market under EMU
Since the mid-1990s there has been considerable debate about how fiscal policy should be used within EMU (Butti et al., 2003) . A lot of attention has been given to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the need to prevent government deficits exceeding 3 per cent of GDP. However, much less attention has been given to how fiscal policy should be used to manage individual regional economies. In particular, the potential problems that may arise for regional economies in EMU from local asset market bubbles, primarily in property, have not received much attention. We know now that the costs of failing to control such phenomena are very high and can be magnified by the damage done to the regional financial system.
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Generally, where substantial bubbles do occur they are reflected in a significant balance of payments deficit. In the case of Spain the rising balance of payments deficit goes back to the early years of EMU whereas for Ireland it only manifested itself in the last five years. In both cases the balance of payments deficit was a symptom of the domestic crowding out of the tradable sector due to the dramatic increase in building activity beyond its sustainable level. The consequence was a rapid rise in domestic costs, pricing the tradable sector out of its world markets. developments. However, there are other instruments available to governments in EMU to achieve the same effect. The problem is just that they have not been used.
In preparation for possible membership of EMU the management of the housing sector was considered by the British Treasury in a document published in 2003 (Treasury, 2003) . They considered that the loss of the interest rate instrument would obviously restrict the scope for economic policy to manage this important sector of the economy. They suggested that policy makers would have to make more active use of fiscal instruments, specifically taxation, to manage risks to the wider economy arising from possible housing bubbles. In particular, they suggested that stamp duty (a transactions tax) could be used to temporarily change the cost of housing investment for households. Fitz Gerald, 2001 , suggested reducing income tax allowances for mortgage interest payments or even a tax on mortgage interest payments.
In each case the effect of the tax instrument would be to raise the cost of borrowing or financing housing investment, tending to reduce demand pressures and, hence, prices below the level they would otherwise reach. As outlined in the model in Section 3, by raising the cost of capital such a tax would exert significant downward pressure on house prices. Through its effect on the income of potential borrowers it would also tend to reduce demand pressures. Of the alternatives the taxation of mortgage interest payments may be the best instrument to use. In increasing the current outgoings of households it would reduce their ability to take on debt. As a result, when the danger of a bubble is over and the taxes are abolished or reduced, households would end up with a lower stock of debt for the same stock of housing.
However, adopting such targeted fiscal policy instruments may be difficult to explain to a wider public.
Within the Euro area the risks to the financial sector from any potential, housing bubble depend on the extent of the regional banking system's exposure to the regional economy and its exposure within that economy to the housing (property) sector.
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Because of the fact that housing bubbles are essentially regional in nature, the more geographically diversified the financial system is the more robust it will be in the face of idiosyncratic shocks. However, it is important for the regulatory authorities when stress testing their financial systems to take account of both the regional diversity of a bank's loan portfolio and also to take account of the possible wider economic consequences of a housing bubble. In particular, when housing bubbles burst they tend to be associated with much wider macro-economic disruption, which is likely to affect employment and output levels.
A serious shock to the agricultural, energy and regional property sectors in the Federal Reserve of Kansas City District in the US in the mid-1980s caused many local banks to fail. 19 As a result of this experience the local Federal Reserve Board advocated greatly increased securitisation of mortgage debt in its Economic Review in subsequent years. This was designed to reduce the vulnerability of the local financial system, which was very exposed to the regional economy (due to lack of regional diversification due to the operation of the Glass-Stiegel act). However, we have seen the dangers that securitisation can bring: the securitisation of mortgage assets in the US spread the risks of a housing bust far and wide. This highlighted the fact that securitisation is only as good as the original mortgage assets and we have seen that in the case of the US these assets were not very good! However, if properly regulated such instruments may still prove important in reducing risks where banking systems are regional in nature.
The financial regulatory authorities in individual regional economies can play a vital role in ensuring the financial stability of their financial systems. If more attention had been paid to the threats to financial stability in Ireland the problems today would be much less acute than they actually are. However, in a financially integrated world, where banks operating in an individual economy are regulated by different national authorities, it may not be feasible to manage the domestic housing market merely by better financial regulation. In the case of Ireland, even if the domestic regulator had acted sensibly, limiting the exposure of the domestic financial system to the domestic housing market, this would not have prevented foreign owned banks from providing excessive credit. The only comprehensive instrument available to the government was fiscal policy.
Outside the Euro area, in particular in Poland and Hungary (see EFN, 2006) , the potential risks to the economy from a housing boom are being enhanced through the move to borrowing in euros or Swiss francs. Such borrowing by households in foreign currencies was previously a factor in the financial crisis in Scandinavia in the early 1990s (Jonung, Kiander and Vartia, 2008) . This pattern of behaviour makes these economies vulnerable to exchange rate shocks and it could also see the costs to the economy of a normal adjustment process after a macro-economic shock, involving changes in exchange rates, being greatly magnified through the direct effects on the net asset position of households.
The experience of the past, both in the US and in Europe, indicates that there is a little danger of a Euro-wide housing bubble posing problems for policy makers in the near future. However, regional booms and busts can and are happening and past experience indicates that they have serious implications for the regional economies so affected. In addition, problems in the housing market can affect the regional financial sector where problems of bad debts occur. This emphasises the need for the authorities in individual EU member states to use fiscal policy actively to prevent bubbles occurring. They also need to improve their regulation of their domestic financial systems to discourage banks from taking excessive risk which endangers the economy as a whole as well, of course, as the individual banks' well-being.
Conclusions
Prior to EMU member states had the opportunity to manage the domestic housing market through monetary policy. However, under EMU monetary policy is targeted at the Euro area inflation rate and, because of the idiosyncratic nature of the housing sector across the Euro zone, the stance of monetary policy will only help control housing bubbles by accident.
Under these circumstances the best instrument available to governments to manage regional housing markets is fiscal policy. Through suitably targeted tax instruments the authorities can change the cost of housing services faced by households, influencing their investment behaviour. Using this instrument effectively may prove politically difficult, partly because of its novelty. However, as housing bubbles are as likely to happen in the future as in the past, it will be important for governments to develop an understanding of the potential dangers of shocks in the housing sector to the wider economy and of the implications of EMU for how the housing market must be managed.
In addition, the advent of monetary union has not absolved governments from the duty to manage domestic inflationary pressures using fiscal policy. Instead of focusing on the SGP target of "not running a deficit" it may instead be appropriate for some countries to run substantial surpluses for a period of years.
A second important implication for policy is the need for the regulatory authorities to take appropriate measures to safeguard their domestic financial sectors. In stress testing the financial system they need to take account of the likelihood that macroeconomic shocks may affect all economies within the EMU. Such shocks, whether or not they are combined, with a rise in real interest rates, may seriously affect the housing sector. While shocks to the housing sector are most unlikely to be generalised across the Euro area, they may affect a number of regional economies simultaneously, 
